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Barring a special agreement, a private party may not seek redress before
an international tribunal; only national states may bring international claims.'
Therefore, when a state's treatment of a foreign national violates international
law, the foreigner's recovery depends on his national government asserting
diplomatic protection in his behalf.'
Since a state can only protect its own nationals, questions often arise
concerning a nation's right of jus standi, or standing, to press a particular
claim. Most frequently the standing question involves a determination of (a)
what nationality an injured party possesses, or (b) which of several parties
with different nationalities has been injured by the state's violation of
international law.
While the standing question can be troublesome when the party alleging
injury is an individual, 3 the difficulty increases when it is a corporation. Thus,
when a corporation is incorporated in Canada, operates primarily in Spain,
and is owned primarily by Belgian interests, which states have standing to
allege violations of international law by Spain harmful to the corporation? If
the corporation itself is deemed to have a particular nationality different from
that of the owners of the corporation's stocks and bonds, does the owners'
state also have standing to assert the injury?
These questions were presented to the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.)
in the recent case of Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co.' Because the
resolution of these questions generated nine separate opinions, this comment
will serve as an attempt both to synthesize these opinions and consider their
impact on international law. After a survey of the facts it will consider the
court's determination of (I) corporate nationality, (2) standing of a
corporation's national state, and (3) standing of a foreign shareholder's
national state. Lastly, the policy justifications for the decision will be analyzed.
I.

THE FACTS

Barcelona Traction was a holding company, incorporated in Canada,,
which formerly conducted extensive business activities in Spain through
Canadian and Spanish subsidiaries.' The company allegedly was controlled by
a Belgian corporation' having substantial international operations. In 1948,
I1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 291 (Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955); see, e.g., I.C.J.
STAT.-art. 34, para. I.

'Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, [19241 P.C.I.J., ser. A, Nos. 2, 6, 12.
3
See, e.g., Nottebohm Case, [19551 I.C.J. 4.
4[1970] 1.C.J. - 9 1NT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 227 (1970).
'The company was incorporated in Canada in 1911, and maintains its head offices in Toronto.
Id. at para. 8,9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 232.

'The subsidiaries formerly provided most of the electricity in Catalonia, the northeast region
of Spain. Id. at para. 8,9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 232.
'Belgium alleged that its nationals owned approximately 80% of all Barcelona Traction stock
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the Spanish courts, in an action alleged to have resulted in a gross denial of
justice under international law,' declared the company bankrupt and ordered
seizure and sale of its holdings in Spain.' Since Canada had ceased all
diplomatic representations on behalf of the company,'* Belgium sued Spain in
when the bankruptcy proceedings began in 1948. Approximately 75% of the shares were
purportedly held by Sidro, a Belgian corporation. Sidro was alleged to be largely owned by an
international conglomerate incorporated in Belgium and predominantly owned by Belgians. Id.
at paras. 9, 25, 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls at 233, 251.
Evidently, Belgium could not conclusively prove Belgian nationals' control of Barcelona
Traction from 1948, when the bankruptcy proceedings began, through 1962, when the application
to the I.C..J. was filed. Consequently, Belgium did not establish sufficient "links" to give it
standing even if the court had ruled Canada ineligible to represent the claim under the Nottebohm
test. See note 30 infra. Judges Jessup and Gros concurred in dismissal of the Belgian claim for
failure to show the requisite links, rather than accepting the majority view that a state may never
represent shareholder nationals in asserting harm to a corporation. Id. at paras. 73-77, 80, 81,
87, 105, 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 322-33 (Jessup, J., concurring); id. at paras. 26, 27, 9 INT'L
LEGAL MAT'Ls at 349 (Gros, J., concurring).
'States are responsible under international law for injuries resulting from a denial of justice.
See J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 286 (6th ed. H. Waldock 1963). Belgium alleged, inter
alia, that Spain had denied justice by intentionally frustrating all attempts to pay interest on the
sterling bonds, usurping jurisdiction in declaring a Canadian company bankrupt, arbitrarily
breaching numerous provisions of Spanish Law by declaring a solvent company bankrupt and
hastily selling its assets. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., [1970] I.C.J. 9 INT'L
LEGAL MAT'Ls 227, 241-46 (1970).
r'o finance its operations in Spain, Barcelona Traction had issued several series of bonds. Some
of the series required payment of the interest in pesetas, but most required payment in sterling.
When the Spanish civil war broke out in 1936, the company stopped servicing all bonds. The
companies in Spain. Id. at paras. 10-17, 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 233-35.
refused to authorize the transfer of foreign currency to the company which it needed to pay
interest on the sterling bonds. Consequently, servicing on sterling bonds has never been resumed.
On February 9, 1948, three Spanish holders of recently-acquired Barcelona Traction sterling
bonds petitioned a Spanish court to declare Barcelona Traction bankrupt for failure to pay
interest on the sterling bonds. Proceeding under Spanish law, the court issued a judgment
declaring the company bankrupt two days later. Although Barcelona Traction had eight days to
appeal the judgment under local law, it received no judicial notice of the proceedings, and did
not appear to contest them.
Under the terms of the bankruptcy judgment, the company's interim receiver seized all assets
of Barcelona Traction and two of its subsidiary companies in Spain. Since all stock of the
companies was held outside Spain, the court allowed the receiver "constructive civil possession"
of the stock. As a result, the receiver was able to fire the principal officers and all directors of
the companies and convene a meeting of creditors, who elected trustees. The trustees cancelled
all the stock of the companies, including that held outside Spain, and sold new certificates in
January 1952. A Spanish company purchased all the assets and acquired complete control of the
companies in Spain. Id. at paras. 10-17, 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 233-35.
"Although, as the Court emphasized, Canada's right of representing Barcelona Traction
remains unaffected, by the instant case, id. at para. 83, 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls at 271, Canada
had in fact ceased its efforts prior to Belgium's initiation of the present suit. Canada did intervene
occasionally between 1948 and 1955, but confined its efforts to promoting a settlement by the
parties. Id. at para. 21,9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls at 235.
The Court rejected the suggestion that Canada may have refused to intervene because it had no
means of obtaining compulsory jurisdiction over Spain for a preceeding before the I.C.J., and
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the I.C.J. for damages" caused to Belgian shareholders.
The present suit began in 1962 after fourteen years of representations and
negotiations between the governments and the private parties concerned-"
Spain filed four preliminary objections to the claim. 3 In 1964, the Court dismissed two of the objections and joined the other two to the merits." In its latest
judgment, the Court in effect sustained Spain's third preliminary objection by
holding that Belgium had no standing to represent Belgian shareholders in a
Canadian corporation alleging injury to the corporation by Spain.
II.

CORPORATE NATIONALITY

Both Belgium and Spain agreed that Canada was the national state of
Barcelona Traction." Nevertheless, the I.C.J. found it necessary, in ruling on
the standing question, to articulate its test of corporate nationality.
Authorities have differed for many years on which test should determine
corporate nationality under international law."6 The United States and the
United Kingdom, in time of peace," have consistently followed the common
noted that Spain had never refused to accept the jurisdiction of the I.C.J. in a suit by Canada in
behalf of Barcelona Traction. Id. at paras. 82-83, 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls at 270-71. However,
Canada's only real interest in Spain's bankruptcy proceedings was obtaining payment on the
company's sterling bonds held by a Toronto trust company. When these were discharged from
the proceeds of the bankruptcy sale, "Canadian interest declined." Id. at para. 37, 9 INT'L LEGAL
MAT'Ls at 305-06 (Jessup, J., concurring). For a statement by the Canadian Secretary of State
for External Affairs indicating his government's lack of interest, see Barcelona Traction, Light
& Power Co. (Preliminary Objections), [1964] I.C.J. 6, 62 (Koo, Vice President, separate opinion).
"Belgium was seeking substantial damages, including: (I) $78 million, the net value in 1948 of
88% of the company's property seized by Spain, (2) 6% interest on the $78 million since 1948,
(3) $3,800,000 representing expenses incurred by Belgians in protecting their rights, (4) principal
and interest on Belgian-held Barcelona Traction sterling bonds, and (5) principal and interest
owed by the subsidiaries. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., [1970] I.C.J. para. 25,
9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 227, 238 (1970).

"In addition to the diplomatic negotiations between 1948 and 1962, extensive litigation occurred
in Spanish courts. According to Spain, some 494 judgments were given by lower and 37 by higher
courts. Id. at para. 18, 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls at 235.
iThe preliminary objections were as follows: (I) Since Belgium had submitted a claim involving
Barcelona Traction Co. in 1958, and had withdrawn it in 1961, the case was closed; (2) Spain
had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the court: (3) Belgium lacked jus standi to represent the
claim of a Canadian corporation: and (4) Barcelona Traction had not exhausted remedies
available in Spain. See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Preliminary Objections), 119641
I.C.J. 6, 11-12.
"The court dismissed objections (I) and (2), and joined (3) and (4) to the merits. Id. at 47.
"Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., [1970] I.C.J. paras. 74, 83, 9 INT'L LEGAL
MAT'Ls 227, 269, 271 (1970).
"See generally 2 E. RABEL, CONFLICT OF LAWS 31-68 (2d ed. 1960); I G. SCHWARZENERGER,
INTERNATIONAL LAw 387-412 (3d ed. 1957). Beckett, Diolomatic Claims in Respect of Injuries
to Companies, 17 TRANSACT. GROT. Soc'Y 175 (1932); Harris, The Protection of Companies in
InternationalLaw in the Light of the Nottebohm Case, 18 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 275, 295-301
(1969); Kronstein. The Nationality of International Enterprises, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 985-90
(1952).
"See note 21 infra.
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law approach of representing only companies incorporated under local law."
Practice in civil law countries, on the other hand, has been to represent
companies whose siege social, or seat of control, is located within their
borders." When a nation is determining not whether to represent a
corporation injured by a foreign nation but whether to seize a corporation's
property under an Alien Property Act, a "control" test may instead be
employed." Most nations" have found the control test impractical in
"6See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 27
(1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]; Beckett, supra note 16, at 185; 1961 Harvard Draft
Convention on the international Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, art. 21, para.
(3)(d), 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545,578 (1961).
"See. e.g., 2 E. RABEL. supra note 16, at 33; cf. I G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 16, at
393-95.
Siige social has different meanings in the various civil law countries which adopt it as the test
of corporate nationality. In some states "seat of control" refers to the place named by
incorporators to satisfy a statutory requirement. This "seat" therefore, would generally
correspond to the "place of incorporation," and the effect of the common and civil law tests
would be the same. Beckett, supra note 16, at 186-88.
France, however, imposes the stricter requirement that a company's sige social riel et srieux
be located within France. This "seat" is the place where corporate decisions are made rather than
the formal "seat of control." See Harris, supra note 16, at 300. The French approach parallels
the "nerve center" test used in some domestic United States jurisdictions to pinpoint a
corporation's principal place of business for purposes of diverse citizenship. See Scot Typewriter
Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Other United States jurisdictions
determine corporate citizenship by the place of operation; this test is concerned less with the state
where top management is located than where assets, employees and overall business operations
can be found. See Kelly v. United States Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1960).
Sin wartime, common and civil law countries have found the place of incorporation and sige
social irrelevant for determining whether an apparently friendly corporation is in fact enemy
controlled and its property should be seized. These countries instead have utilized a test of
corporate nationality based on economic realities (e.g., the nationality of directors, shareholders).
The English House of Lords seems to have originated the control test in the case of Daimler Co.
v. Continental Tyre & Rubber Co., [1916] 2 A.C. 307. See 2 E. RABEL. supra note 16, at 58 n.99;
Domke, The Control of Corporations-Application of the Enemy Test in the United States of
America, 3 INT'L L.Q. 52, at 52 n.1 (1950). Some application of the test was made by the mixed
arbitration commissions in interpreting the treaty of Versailles. 2 E. RABEL. supra note 16. at
59.
The United States Supreme Court was unwilling to recognize the control test. In Behn, Meyer
* Co. v. Miller, 266 U.S. 457 (1925), the Court refused to permit seizure of assets belonging to
a company incorporated in a British colony even though the company was largely enemy owned.
This result was later overturned by statute. Trading with the Enemy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 95a (1958).
Following Congress' lead, the Court overruled Behn, Meyer in Clarke v. Uebersee FinanzKorporation, A.G., 332 U.S. 480, 488-89 (1947), and allowed seizing a corporation's assets after
piercing the corporate veil (in this case, the place of incorporation) to find enemy control.
See generally 2 E. RABEL. supra note 16, at 57-63; Domke, supra; Fink, That Pierced
Veil-Friendly Stockholders and Enemy Corporations, 51 MICH. L. REV. 651 (1953).
"Although some French writers encouraged adoption of the control test in peacetime situations,
their view was not widely adopted and was later rejected. See 2 E. RABEL, supra note 16, at
60-61.
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peacetime because ownership of stock constantly changes and often no single
nation represents a majority of the shareholders.
Without discussing the relative merits of the corporate nationality tests the
majority in Barcelona Traction adopted the place of incorporation test:
The traditional rule attributes the right of diplomatic protection of a
corporate entity to the State under the laws of which it is incorporated and
in whose territory it has its registered office. These two criteria have been
confirmed by long practice and by numerous international instruments.Y
III.

RIGHTS OF THE CORPORATION'S STATE

Many nations, including the United States, refuse to represent the claims
of a corporation which under the applicable corporate nationality test would
be a domestic corporation, unless its nationals would derive benefits justifying
such representation. 1 Until recently, though, the standing of a state to
represent the claim of a national, whether an individual or a corporation, was
never questioned. 24 While a state had no international duty to provide
diplomatic protection when it had no reason to do so,21 it had an unquestioned
right to represent its nationals who were injured by a foreign state's violation
of international law. 3
This sovereign option was qualified by the I.C.J. in the Nottebohm Case."
There, Leichtenstein presented the claim of a naturalized citizen. Prior to the
outbreak of World War II, Nottebohm, a German national living in
Guatemala, convinced Leichtenstein to naturalize him in return for his
promise to pay taxes in Leichtenstein for life. Guatemala, lifting the veil of
naturalization, seized his property during World War If because of his ties
with the enemy, Germany. The court denied the claim. It held that Nottebohm
did not have a sufficient connection with Leichtenstein to establish that nation's
right to represent him before an international tribunal.23
Given that the rules of diplomatic protection applicable to corporations
germinated from those applicable to individuals, there has been speculation as
to whether the "genuine connection" required by Nottebohm would limit the
right of states to represent corporations. 3 Two judges concurring in Barcelona
Traction argued that Nottebohm should apply. Judge Jessup found that
• . . the existence of a link between a corporation holding a "charter of

nBarceiona Traction, Light & Power Co., [19701 I.C.J.
227, 268 (1970).

-

para. 70, 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS

"See 5 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 839 (1943) (American State

Department position); Harris, supra note 16, at 301-10.
"See Harris, supra note 16, at 275-85.
26 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 987 (1906); I L. OPPENHEIM. supra note

1,at § 319.
mMavrommatis Palestine Concessions, [19241 P.C.I.J. ser. A, No. 2, at 12.
-[1955] I.C.J. 4.
Did. at 26.

"See Harris, supra note 16, at 285-89.
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convenience" and the State granting the charter, is the key to the diplomatic
protection of multinational corporate interest . .. .

Using as his test the "economic reality of the relevant transactions," he
identified as the "overwhelmingly dominant feature in the affairs of Barcelona
Traction" the "influence of far-flung international financial interests"
controlled by the Sofina group.3 ' This resulted in the conclusion that
'
"Belgium remains the only identifiable claimant against Spain." 3
The majority, however, clearly rejected the requirement of a close "link"
between the corporation and its national state, finding that,
. . . in the particular field of the diplomatic protection of corporate entities,
no absolute test of the genuine connection has found general
acceptance. . ..

The majority" thus implied that the Nottebohm rationale should be limited to
the diplomatic protection of individuals. The effect of this holding is that the
state of incorporation can choose to represent a corporate claimant without
establishing the "genuine connections" between the company and the state
which would justify the effort of representing the company.
IV.

RIGHTS OF THE SHAREHOLDERS' STATE

While the corporate state has a right to protect its nationals, it may refuse
to represent claims having an insubstantial potential benefit to its state." The
question then arises whether the state of the shareholders may pursue the
corporate claim.
International law is unclear on the right of nations to espouse the claims
of their shareholder nationals. Many writers have argued that shareholder
states are entitled to present claims in some circumstances,3 but they do not
'Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., [1970] I.C.J.
227, 310 (1970) (Jessup, J., concurring).

-

para. 42, 9

INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS

'Id. at para. 17, 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 302.
1d. at para. 37, 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls at 307.
33d. at para. 70,9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 268.
2

"The Court was far from unanimous in rejecting the Nottebohm analogy. Judge Jessup's
endorsement of it, supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text, was echoed by Judge Gros. [1970]
I.C.J. _ para. 24, 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 210, 347 (1970) (Gros. J., concurring). Judges Petren
and Onyeama state that the applicability of the "genuine connection" principle to corporations
need not be decided because of the majority's recognition that Canada had standing to protect the
corporation's interests. Id., 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 277 (Petren & Onyeama JJ., concurring).
Judge Tanaka evidentally believed the "link" theory -to be correct. See id., 9 INT'L LEGAL
MAT'LS at 289-300 (Tanaka, J., concurring). In dissent, Judge Riphagen applied the "link" theory
and found a sufficient bond with Belgium to allow its representation of Barcelona Traction. Id. at
paras. 15, 23, 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls al 355 (Riphagen, J., dissenting).
uThe United States, while maintaining the right in certain circumstances to represent any
domestic corporation, generally will represent an American corporation only if at least 50% of
all classes of stock are beneficially owned by United States interests. See Harris, supra note 16,
at 302; cf. R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR ADJUDICATION BY NATIONAL
COMMISSIONs 89 (1962).

"See generally Bagge, Intervention on the Ground of Damage Caused to Nationals, with

1970]

THE BARCELONA TRACTION CASE

agree on what are those circumstances. Most of the writers do, however, agree
on the appropriateness of the following two circumstances: (1) where the
company is defunct and cannot act for itself,37 and (2) where the state of incorporation is the state which has harmed the company.3 Some writers have
urged that shareholder states have standing whenever the foreign corporation
fails to protect itself.3' Other writers, following the lead of some international
agreements and treaties, would allow representation by the shareholder state
when the corporate state fails to act."
The various opinions in Barcelona Traction adopted or at least considered
each of these approaches." The majority of the Court noted that "there may
ParticularReference to Exhaustion of Local Remedies and the Rights of Shareholders, 34 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 162 (1958); Beckett, supra note 16; Harris, supra note 16; Jones, Claims on Behalf
of Nationals who Are Shareholders in Foreign Companies, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 225 (1949);
Note,
Piercingthe Corporate Veil under InternationalLaw, 16 SYRACUSE L. REV. 770 (1965).
3tBaasch & Romer Claim (Netherlands v.Venezuela), RALSTON, VENEZUELAN ARBITRATIONS OF
1903, 906 (1904); 8 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1269 (1967); Beckett, supra
note 16, at 189-90; Jones, supra note 36, at 236.

uDelagoa Bay Ry. Case (Great Britain v. Portugal, 1889), 2 J. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATIONS 1965 (1898); 6 J. MOORE, supra note 25, at 647-69; RESTATEMENT § 172; 8 M.
WHITEMAN, supra note 37, at 1284; Beckett, supra note 16, at 190; Jones, supra note 36, at 236,
257.

3

rrhis approach is patterned after the shareholder derivative suit in which the shareholders
may sue in behalf of the corporation when the officers, directors, or majority shareholders
wrongfully fail to assert the corporation's claim. 8 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 37, at 1284-85;
see Jones, supra note 36, at 236; 1961 HarvardDraft Convention on InternationalResponsibility,
supra note 18, at art. 20, para. 2(c); Note, supra note 36, at 790.
*RESTATEMENT § 173 (1965); cf Jones, supra note 36, at 236-37.
"Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice would grant standing to the shareholder state when the state
of incorporation is the tortfeasor, or the company's government refuses to act. He acknowledges,
however, that, at least in the latter case, the law does not grant standing to the shareholder state.
Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., [19701 I.C.J. paras. 22, 23, 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS
227, 279-80 (1970) (Fitzmaurice, J., concurring).
Judge Tanaka found no justification in international law for limiting the standing of a
shareholder state to the two well recognized exceptions (see text with notes 37 and 38), and urged
that a shareholder's state should always be allowed to protect its interests. Id., 9 INT'L LEGAL
MAT'LS

at 294-96 (Tanaka, J., concurring).

Judges Gros and Jessup would recognize Belgium's standing in the instant case because of its
substantial links with the company. Id. at para. 19, 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 346 (Gros, J.,
concurring); Id. at paras. 57-58,9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls at 314-15 (Jessup, J., concurring).
Judge Nervo finds the standing of a shareholder state more limited than the other judges. He
accepts the right of representation when the company has been liquidated or the direct rights (e.g.,
share in liquidation) of the shareholders are involved. However, in terms redolent of sovereign
immunity, he vigorously dissents from the majority's dictum that a shareholder state can represent
a corporate claim in the tortfeasor. Id., 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 337-38 (Nervo, J., concurring).
In 1964, Vice President Wellington Koo, who did not sit in the instant decision on the merits,
dissented from the joinder to the merits of Spain's preliminary objection that Belgium lacked
standing. At the time he urged standing for the shareholder states whenever the state of
incorporation refused to sue or unsuccessfully pursued diplomatic protection of the company.
Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Preliminary Objections), [19641 I.C.J. 6, 53, 59
(Koo, Vice President, separate opinion).
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in principle be special circumstances which justify the lifting of the veil in the
interest of shareholders."' 2 But, depending on a distinction between rights and
interestsO the majority ruled that in most instances only the corporation's
national state could intervene:
...Whenever a shareholder's interests are harmed by an act done to the
company, it is to the latter that he must look to institute appropriate action;
for although two separate entities may have suffered from the same wrong,
it is only one entity whose rights have been infringed."
The majority reasoned that since the injury was to Barcelona Traction, only
its rights were infringed. The shareholders had only an "interest" in the claim.
Thus only Canada, not Belgium, had jus standi in the I.C.J. to assert the
violation of a right.
V.

THE POLICY

From the standpoint of the shareholders, Barcelona Traction yielded a
harsh result. The Belgian owners of the company lost millions of dollars
because of acts by the Spanish government which quite possibly were violative
of international law. Nonetheless, there are sound policy reasons which support
the Court's decision. First, the i.C.J., as an extremely limited forum, must
exercise far more judicial restraint than a domestic tribunal. Second, the rule
that only the state of incorporation may press a corporate claim adds needed
certainty to international law.
The I.C.J. is a court with narrowly limited jurisdiction. It has only the
power which sovereign states have specifically granted to it." The Court must,
therefore, exercise extreme caution in order that it not overstep its bounds. If
nations should come to believe that the Court is deciding questions beyond
the scope of its jurisdiction, they could easily terminate their consent to future
jurisdiction, and thereby strip the Court of its usefulness as a judicial agency
for the settlement of international disputes."
In the present case, it is highly doubtful that Spain consented to be sued
by Belgium for denying justice to a company which it considered to be
Canadian. In addition, none of the circumstances 7 in which shareholder states
have been previously allowed to present claims were evident. Therefore, the
Court was correct in disallowing the claim by relying on customary
international law.
12Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., [19701 I.C.J. - para. 58, 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS
227, 265 (1970).
""...Not a mere interest affected, but solely a right infringed, involves responsibility, so that
an act directed against and infringing only the company's rights does not involve responsibility
towards the shareholders, even if their interests are affected." Id. at para. 46, 9 INT'L LEGAL
MAT'LS

at 263.

"Id.at para. 44,9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 262.
"Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, [1924] P.C.I.J. ser. A., No. 2, at 16.

4Cf.H. LAUTERPACHT,
COURT 91 (1958).

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL

4'See notes 37-40 supra, and accompanying text.
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Moreover, the Court's decision will have a positive long range effect upon
developing international law. By designating the state of incorporation as the
only state which may represent a corporate international claim, the Court
created certainty in a previously unsettled area of law. Any of the proposed
alternative tests for choosing the corporation's claimant state would have had
the opposite effect. Thus, if Judge Jessup's "link" test" had been adopted,
the Court would have had to decide, in each particular case, which state had
the closest connection" with the corporation involved in the dispute: the state
of incorporation, the state of siege social, or one of the three or four states
containing a significant percentage of the company's shareholders, bondholders, or creditors. In the I.C.J., where jurisdiction is only by consent, this
kind of uncertainty is intolerable.
The state of incorporation test is clearly not the most equitable means for
determining which state should press an international claim." A modified
"link" test may eventually prove to be much fairer to all the parties involved.
It is evident, however, that such a test, to be workable, must be concrete.
Thus, long-range reform of the judicial process should come from such quasilegislative bodies as the International Law Commission and the United
Nations General Assembly.
Barcelona Traction does not create the best of all possible rules. It does
state a positive, concrete rule. The decision thus enhances the restrained image
of the I.C.J., and furthers the cause of voluntary state submission to the
processes of international law.
W.B.S. III

aSee notes 30-32 supra, and accompanying text.
"The "link" test is analogous to the modern American rule for choice-of-law in tort:
The local law of the state which has the most significant relationship with the
occurrence and with the parties determines their rights and liabilities in tort.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379(l) (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964); see Reich
v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d
473, 191 N.E.2d 279,240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
It is interesting to note, however, that an explanation of the "significant relationship" test
occupies seventy-nine pages in the proposed draft of the RESTATEMENT. The test involves a great
amount of judicial discretion. It is therefore not appropriate for use in the I.C.J. See text
accompanying notes 45-46 supra.
wFor example, Canada has no interest in representing Barcelona Traction's claim. See note 10
supra. The real interest is in Belgium and an advanced legal system would probably allow Belgium
to press the claim. Cf.note 49 supra.

